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We know for a long time that expert system (ES) must not know in a different way than how 
man knows. We would not expect men to adapt their thinking processes to the machine, would 
we? Evolution would not let peoples' minds adopt criteria weighting or fuzzy logic. This is 
why we developed our Doctus1 knowledge-based expert system based on symbolic logic ± that 
is the easiest to understand artificial knowledge representation to the decision taker. How-
ever, this is all history now... Now we perhaps understand decision takers better ± maybe it 
was worth observing them for nearly two decades. Decision takers, and we mean only the 
most experienced ones, want to be able to play around a bit with a particular decision and, 
eventually, they want some help in delegating the decisions they are bored with. 
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Introduction 
:HKDYHGHYHORSHGWKHILUVWYHUVLRQRI'RFWXVEDVHGRQ6LPRQ¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIERXQGHGUa-
tionality, his distinction of programmed and non-programmed decisions, and on our view of 
knowledge. These we shall briefly describe in the following sections, as they are still valid. It 
also wore the mark of the time: the available technical/programming facilities and the busi-
ness environment; these we shall not describe here, as they are outdated. 
Once the background is thus prepared, we are going to introduce the µold Doctus¶, i.e. we will 
describe the deductive, inductive and reductive reasoning in Doctus as it is today. We will do 
this following the timeline in terms of the order of added features; however, we are going to 
disregard the various ways of implementing these ± we will always describe the latest solu-
tions. That way, following a thread of history, we arrive at today. 
When Doctus has stepped into the adulthood, we sat down to draw the line and review our 
experiences. In the 18 years with Doctus, we had around 140 consultancy projects, the vast 
majority of them for top executives. We had summarized our successes and failures on more 
than few occasions over these year, we wanted to do something different this time: we wanted 
to overview which are the features of our ES that decision takers like and make use of and to 
decide where to go next with the development. In the final section we tell the story of the les-
sons learned. What we have learned underlies the present development of the µnew Doctus¶ ± 
suitably codenamed Doctus Light. 
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 http://www.doctus.info/ 
1. Rationalities, Decisions, Knowledges 
According to the idea of homo economicus (Sen, 2002: 19 ff) people are totally (infinitely) 
rational, meaning that they search for the optimal solution, for the best of all. This would 
mean that all the decision alternatives are considered and they are compared according to each 
and every feature. Even if we disregard the simple technical issues, e.g. that the features were 
all supposed not only to be measurable but measurable in the same of convertible unit, there 
are still numerous reasons why this is impossible: there are too many solutions to find all of 
them; identification of some of the attributes would require knowledge that is not yet ac-
quired; if all the decision alternatives and attributes have been identified there is still the task 
to gather data about each and every alternative, considering each and every attribute; and 
there is also a time-limit. March and Simon (1993: 157 ff) examined the limitations of ration-
ality; and they show that the above-mentioned limitations on the number of attributes and 
alternatives are direct consequences of cognitive and organizational limits. 
Thus Simon (1997) developed the conception of bounded rationality in which he offers two 
choices to the decision taker: 
The first is to take her/his decision according to the total rationality described above, though 
the searching space ± the number of decision alternatives and the aspects considered ± and the 
time-span of comparison get limited. It is necessary to add that this is an impermissible over-
simplification of the reality. It is not Simon who simplifies the world impermissibly but the 
decision taker adopting this framework of rationality. (S)he usually believes that the world 
and (s)he in it really operates according to the total rationality. (S)he does recognize the limi-
tations, believing that (s)he really does search for the best solution. This still does not mean 
that this conception of rationality is entirely useless as the experience may sensibly limit the 
searching space; e.g. we may know that there are only three suppliers in the world capable of 
providing a certain product or service and that they only compete on a few features. 
The other possibility for the decision taker is to define her/his expectations and to start the 
search afterwards. Once the expectations are defined, the solutions come one-by-one; the de-
cision taker compares the features of a solution to her/his expectations before proceeding to 
another solution, thus taking a series of decisions. The first solution that satisfies the expecta-
tions is accepted and it is called a satisfactory solution. Time plays an important role in this 
kind of search: if no alternative is accepted for a long while (i.e. no alternative fits the expec-
tations), the decision taker modifies her/his expectations and/or the relations among them. 
We give further detailed elaboration of the rationalities elsewhere (e.g. Baracskai, 2000; 
Baracskai & Velencei, 2004; Dörfler, 2005), here the aim was only to present the conception 
IRUPLQJWKHEDVLVRIORJLFLQ'RFWXV¶GHGXFWLYHUHasoning. The next step is to distinguish the 
various types of decisions relevant to the different ways of reasoning in Doctus. 
Another model of Simon (1977: 31 & 45-49) distinguishes between programmed and non-
programmed decisions. Programmed or well-structured decisions are those that frequently 
occur and thus we can have elaborated procedures on how to handle them; these can often 
literally be programmed. Non-programmed or ill-structured decisions appear in novel situa-
tions that we meet for the first time and thus there cannot be any elaborated procedures avail-
able. The programmed and the non-programmed decisions are non-existing extremities (black 
and white) of a continuum (greyscale) in which the real life decisions reside. As a further de-
velopment here we describe the decisions using three cornerstones (Figure 1): 
Reflex decisions are taken without thinking, i.e. these are reactions not responses of the or-
ganization; e.g. paying wages or maintaining stock level belong here. These decisions are to 
be instant and can be handled by assisting staff. Although we do not address the reflex deci-
sions directly with Doctus, there can be a computer support to these decisions; only they 
would not normally require knowledge bases, databases and hardwired procedures would suf-
fice. 
Routine decisions are taken by managers following some set of explicit rules, such as launch-
ing a new product, adapting a new technology, or evaluating suppliers. The knowledge used 
in these decisions comes from the experience we got by taking similar decisions and we are 
aware of the decision aspects (attributes) and of the rules between the values of these attrib-
utes. Routine decision is the closest real-life resemblance of programmed decisions but it they 
are not the same. Although routine decisions incorporate a vast amount of attributes and rules, 
the importance of individual remains in focus. Sometimes we may need a new logical rule 
between the values of the attributes, or consider some new attributes or ignore some of the old 
ones. With Doctus we aim at speeding up these decisions by inductive knowledge bases (see 
later). 
Original decisions are those that we take for the first time, such as starting (or continuing) an 
R&D project or entering a new market. These obviously belong to changes and thus to leader-
ship (see e.g. Kotter, 1999; Kotter & Cohen, 2002). These situations come the closest to the 
non-programmed decisions, although, they are not the same as we always now something 
even about the most novel situation. Typically, original decisions are the responsibility of a 
leader, who does not have any experience with it (as no one has); however, it does not mean 
that (s)he is novice decision taker. This decision type has an additional feature: there are no 
well defied attributes. In Doctus the attributes are, in such cases, defined using symbols and 















Figure 1: Decision types 
In our view managers and leaders of the e.era should not spend any time on reflex decisions. 
Finding the rules for routine decisions facilitates the delegation of these decisions. Excellence 
is up to original decisions. If all decisions are considered to be original decisions, the e-
business looses on efficiency; if all are considered to be routines, the e-business becomes 
rigid and dies. We can find some correspondence between the rationalities model and this 
decision typology: the routine decisions, and thus the inductive knowledge bases, correspond 
to bounded rationality. The deductive knowledge base in its final form also corresponds to 
bounded rationality but the essence here is the learning process of structuring the expecta-
tions. In both cases with Doctus we design a representation of the knowledge of a man-
ager/leader and the involved domain experts. For better understanding next we give a brief 
overview of how we classify knowledge. 
2XU W\SRORJ\ LV EDVHGRQ5\OH¶V (1949) distinction of knowing that and knowing how; the 
same categories were identified by Anderson (1983) as propositional (declarative) and proce-
dural knowledge. Gurteen (1998) identified a further type that he called knowing why. We 
add further two categories, knowing what and knowing it. To organize these knowledge types 
LQWRDPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHPRGHOZHXVH3RODQ\L¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIWDFLWNQRZOHGJH (Polanyi, 
1966) and, based on this, the distinction of focal and subsidiary knowledge (Polanyi, 1962), 
DOVRWDNLQJRQERDUG0LQVN\¶V(1994) distinction of positive and negative knowledge. Instead 
of describing these various models in detail we present our synthesized model (Figure 2) and 


















Figure 2: Knowledge types 
The focal part of IDFWVLVWKHHYHQW7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRWKHµNQRZ-LW¶WKLVNQRZOHGJHLVWDFLW
The subsidiary knowledge of facts is the evaluation, i.e. the rules of evaluating; this is a 
µNQRZ-WKDW¶ZKLFKLVH[SOLFLW)RUH[Dmple, the jump of a pole-vaulter is a fact. Its subsidiary 
part is the knowledge about the measuring standard and how to use it. The focal part is our 
experience of the jump; this includes e.g. that the bar did not fall down. As we see, the focal 
facts are something much richer than what is usually called facts. The second-hand facts (De 
Bono, 1976: 12-14) belong to the domain of propositions, i.e. they will not be focal but sub-
sidiary facts. The essence of the second-hand facts is not the correspondence to the reality but 
the controllability; e.g. we can check in lexicons that Lee Harvey Oswald killed Kennedy, so 
it is a fact even if we cannot be sure if it is true. 
7KHIRFDOSDUWRIVNLOOVLVWKHDFWLRQWKHµNQRZ-KRZ¶7KHVXEVLGLDU\SDUWLVWKHVHWRIUXOHV of 
practising and second-KDQGIDFWVDERXWSUDFWLVLQJZKLFKLVµNQRZ-WKDW¶(JWKHDFWLVPRYe-
ment with the bicycle with the subsidiary rules of keeping the balance. Experiencing events 
and practising skills are both experiences but while the former is passive the later is active. 
7KHIRFDOLQWXLWLRQLVWKHKXQFKZKHQRQHVHQVHVWKHGLUHFWLRQZKLFKLVµNQRZ-ZKDW¶RUWKH
solution, which is µNQRZ-ZK\¶7KHVXEVLGLDU\LQWXLWLRQLVWKHH[SRVWH[SODQDWLRQZKLFKKDV
to follow the rules of formal logic strictly, regardless whether it was how the hunch happened 
or not. Similarly to the previous two subsidiary knowledge types, the explanation uses sec-
ond-hand facts, which belong to µNQRZ-WKDW¶,WLVDXVHIXOLPDJHWRGHVFULEHKXQFKDVDSSOy-
ing a number of rules tacitly at the same time, as Simon (1987) did. To contrast the focal in-
tuition to the previous two types of focal knowledge we can say that those were both external 
experiences while the hunch is an inner experience. 
,IZHSURSHUO\XQGHUVWDQGWKHRUJDQL]DWLRQRIWKHVHNQRZOHGJHW\SHVZHVHHWKDWRQO\µNQRZ-
WKDW¶LHWKDWVXEVLGLDU\NQRZOHGJHW\SHVFDQ be put into words and thus only this can be used 
in building knowledge bases. However, we also indicated that we can make countless state-
ments about our experience, and thus by building a knowledge base we convert a small part of 
WKH H[SHUW¶V DQGGHFLVLRQ WDNHUVNQRZOHGJH IURP WDFLW µNQRZ-LW¶ µNQRZ-KRZ¶ µNQRZ-ZK\¶
DQGµNQRZ-ZKDW¶LQWRH[SOLFLW± this is an important added value of Doctus. 
2. 7KH³2OG'RFWXV´ 
Doctus is a knowledge-based expert system2 that is aimed at supporting the decision taker by 
providing her/him with the representation of the expert opinion. As we never believed that 
people think in numbers, we based Doctus on symbolic artificial intelligence (AI). Nobody 
thinks that the beautiful is 3.6 times better than the ugly. In symbolic AI the representation 
consists of concepts, acquired from the experts, which are connected by logical rules in «if... 
then» format. In this representation the concepts are treated as symbols hence the names 
µV\PEROLFORJLF¶DQGµV\PEROLF$,¶DUHXVHG 
The process RIFUHDWLQJDUHSUHVHQWDWLRQRIWKHH[SHUWV¶NQRZOHGJHLQa KBS is called knowl-
edge engineering, and the person doing it is the knowledge engineer. There are two main 
stages of knowledge engineering: during knowledge acquisition we build the initial model 
which is altered, throughout the fine-tuning stage, until the experts accept it. Apart from the 
experts and the knowledge engineer we also invite the decision taker to visit occasionally the 
knowledge engineering process, this makes it easier to use the knowledge base later. 
2.1. Deduction 
The first mode of reasoning in Doctus, both historically and in terms of software complexity, 
is deductive or rule-based reasoning. In this case the experts are required to articulate the as-
pects of decision, the «attributes» and the grades of satisfying these aspects, the «values». The 
values are usually normally defined using ordinal scales but nominal values can also be used. 
To make the acquisition of attributes and values simpler we provided an interface that we ex-
pected the users to handle easily; we designed an Excel-like look-and-feel. (Figure 3) 
  
Figure 3: Attributes and values in Doctus 
The attributes are then organized into a multi-level hierarchy called «rule-based graph». 
(Figure 4) The rule-based graph (RBG) describes the dependencies of the attributes; the 
leaves of the graph are the input attributes, these are the factors of dependant attributes, these 
in turn of other dependant attributes and so forth, until we reach the root of the graph, which 
is the decision the decision attribute. What is important to realize at this point is that the RBG 




we build a kQRZOHGJHEDVHRIH[SHUWV¶WKHVHWZRWHUPVDUHVRPHWLPHVFRPELQHGLQWRµNQRZOHGJH-based expert 
V\VWHP¶.%(6$OWKRXJKWKHWKUHHWHUPVGLIIHULQHPSKDVLVLQWKLVSDSHUWKH\DUHXVHGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\ 
only tells us which the factors of each attribute are but not how the attributes depend on their 
factors. 
 
Figure 4: Rule-based graph in Doctus 
7RDQVZHUWKLVµKRZ¶WKHH[SHUWVDOVRQHHGWRDUWLFXODWHDVHWRI©LIWKHQªUXOHVLQHDFKQRGH
of the graph to connect the values of the attributes; all value combinations need to be covered. 
Over the years we implemented several features to make the rule input easier. First we intro-
duced the complex rules, i.e. rules covering more than one value of one or more attributes, to 
reduce the amount of input. (Figure 5, left) Then we developed a two-dimensional (2-D) rule 
input interface (Figure 5, right) in which one rule corresponds to a cell; a complex rule here 
would be an area of multiple cells (Figure 5, right, black area). Finally we launched the con-
sistency analysis; this notifies about the potential contradictions based on the ordinal nature of 
the values. (Figure 5, right, smilies) The same tool can be used to give advices what are the 
acceptable rule outputs. By these three features we really made the life of the knowledge en-
gineer easier ± unfortunately we gave nothing to the decision taker. We also set up a tool for 
sorting/rearranging/combining the rules; these were quite helpful in teaching about Doctus ± 
so again, nothing for the decision taker. 
            
Figure 5: Rule input in Doctus 
The last input step in deductive reasoning is to describe the decision alternatives, the «cases». 
This is done by assigning a value of each attribute to each case; these are called the case fea-
tures. (Figure 6) Here we also added some features, often asked for by the experts, such as 
value distribution ± but we never met an expert who actually wanted to use it, not to mention 
the decision taker. 
 
Figure 6: Cases in Doctus 
Once the whole deductive knowledge base is thus set up, we can trigger the rules to get the 
decisions for the cases. The results can appear in the RBG and on the «Cases» tab; we have 
found the first one more useful. This is only the beginning of the fine-tuning process, the at-
tributes, values, rules, and case features are refined until the experts agree with the knowledge 
base. To support this we developed «Explain» feature, which takes you to the rule that re-
sulted in a particular output value for a particular case. This was, again, of great use to the 
knowledge engineer and to a lesser extent to the experts but not much to the decision taker ± 
although this is one of the few features that they showed some interest in. 
2.2. Induction 
After using the deductive version on Doctus for nearly a decade we realized that the rule-
EDVHGNQRZOHGJHEDVHGRIWHQGRHVQRWUHDOO\FRUUHVSRQGWRWKHH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQsimply be-
cause they were trying to come up with what they thought is expected from them. We also 
noted that the experts struggle putting their knowledge into rule form ± we understood that the 
experts are treasure houses of experience rather than of rules. Thus, we developed the induc-
tive reasoning, in which the experts articulate the attributes and the values in the same way as 
in deduction but then, instead of describing the rules between the values, they quote cases 
from their experience, together with the decision outcomes. To infer the rules classifying the 
cases according to the outcome values we adopted a modified version of the ID3 algorithm 
developed by Quinlan (1986); later we realized that by applying our modification we came 
YHU\QHDUWR4XLQODQ¶V(1993, 1996) later C4.5 model. 
As in induction the reasoning starts from the particular cases of experience from which Doc-
tus infers general rules, this kind of reasoning is often called case-based reasoning (CBR). 
However, we try to avoid this term as the CBR was inherited from quantitative decision sup-
port and it is still associated with numeric multi-criteria decision making (MCDM).3 The es-
sence of quantitative CBR is ± although often covered by a veil of beautiful graphics ± to de-
fine some metrics, and distance built on it, which will be the measure of similarity. For a new 
case the nearest one ± the most similar ± is searched from the case-base. In symbolic logic we 
consider the cases described with the same rules to be similar. So the logic is similar but there 
LVDFUXFLDOGLIIHUHQFHDVZHQRWHGHDUOLHUZHEHOLHYHWKDWPXFKRIWKHH[SHUWV¶RSLQLRQFDn-
not be quantified/measured. 
The logic of the inductive reasoning is the following: Consider that the all the cases form a 
disordered set, where the order is defined having cases with a single output value in each sub-
set. We forms subsets of cases according to the values of each attribute in turn and we choose 
the one that contributes the most to the order. We call this attribute the most informative one, 
the one with the highest informativity. (Baracskai, Dörfler & Timár, 2003) Then we repeat the 
process on all the subsets which contain cases with more than one output value. The result is 
displayed in the case-based graph (CBG) from which the rules can be read from the root of 
the graph towards each leaf. (Figure 7) 
 
Figure 7: Case-based graph in Doctus 
Due to the inductive logic, not necessarily all the attributes will appear in the CBG, as we stop 
the process as soon as the homogeneity of the output values is achieved. In fact, there are 
rarely more than 5-7 attributes in the graph. In the vast majority of cases the experts are sur-
prised by the first appearance of the graph and frequently they disagree that it accurately de-
scribes their opinion. This is exactly what we expect, and indeed the first version of the graph 
is usually only the starting point of inductive reasoning; the final version is when the experts 
rate it accurate. The fine-tuning in this case includes changing/adding/removing attributes 
and/or values and also removing cases. This was an interesting learning point for us: inductive 
reasoning does not handle the outliers (non-typical cases) well; thus we implemented a feature 
to exclude particular cases from the reasoning without removing them from the knowledge 
base. Occasionally, it is illuminating to understand which cases are the outliers. Another way 
for fine-tuning is to change manually which attribute will appear in a particular node ± as it 
makes sense only if the informativites are nearly the same, the experts should follow the 
NQRZOHGJHHQJLQHHU¶VDGYLFHZKHQLWFDQEHGRQHWhen we worked with the same experts on 
multiple projects, they gradually learned how to provide consistent knowledge representation, 
but the greatest learning occurs exactly during the fine-tuning stage. 
                                                 
3
 Doctus is indeed a tool for supporting multi-criteria decision taking, as there are multiple attributes with multi-
ple values (a value of an attribute is a criterion) but it is not quantitative and the term CBR as well as MCDM is 
normally associated with the quantitative approach. 
Working with experts on fine-tuning on many-many project we gradually developed an inter-
esting skill ourselves: by looking at the graph we became able to assess the knowledge level 
of the experts. This is an important thing, as you cannot build an expert system without an 
expert. On several occasion the only thing we could do was to report to the decision taker that 
her/his so experts are less then experts in their discipline. 
2.3. Reduction 
The third kind of reasoning, that we developed most recently, was born from the idea that if it 
was possible to find out the outcome based on attributes and rules, and it was possible to find 
the rules based on the attributes and the outcomes, it should also be possible to find the attrib-
utes based on the other two. Well, this is not entirely true, as you cannot define the rules and 
the outcomes without describing the attributes first. But we can also observe, as it was men-
tioned in the previous section, that the CBG normally does not contain all the attributes, only 
a few of them. So, although we cannot find the attributes based on the rules and the outcomes, 
we can find out which attributes are relevant. This is what we can read from the CBG ± the 
informative attributes. So we developed a feature to convert the CBG into a deductive knowl-
edge base by a click of the mouse. As the number of the attributes is thus reduced we call this 
third type of reasoning reduction or reductive reasoning. 
It is important that, while we have fewer attributes in reductive knowledge base, it classifies 
all the cases in the same way as if we used all the attributes. It is possible that there will be no 
complete rule sets in each node of the new single-level RBG but these will usually indicate 
impossible case situation, at any rate, a sort of a case that the experts have not seen before. 
There is an interesting way how we can make a deductive knowledge base denser: first we 
build a deductive knowledge base as described in Section 2.1; when we have the outcomes, 
we run the inductive reasoning on the same knowledge base excluding the dependant attrib-
utes; finally we extract the rules from the CBG by applying the reductive reasoning. The re-
ductive knowledge base will give the same output value for all the cases only using fewer, 
often much fewer, attributes. (See a detailed example in Baracskai, Velencei & Dörfler, 2005) 
2.4. Export/Import in Doctus 
There were two drivers almost at the same time pushing us towards connecting Doctus with 
external sources/applications. The first was that companies started to use data warehouses and 
WKH\ZHUHHDJHUWRWU\WRILQGVRPHµNQRZOHGJH¶LQWKHP. The second was that we wanted an 
easy-to-use way of using knowledge bases outside Doctus either for reasoning or gathering 
cases from other people. Therefore we developed the export and import modules of Doctus. 
6WDWLFH[SRUWHGNQRZOHGJHLVVRPHVRUWRI³snapshot´RIWKHNQRZOHGJHEDVHZLWKQRUHDVRn-
ing capability. Different types of graphs and tables can be generated, presenting graphs or 
details about the knowledge base. A report in rtf format, containing all tables is also available. 
Dynamic exported knowledge has capability of reasoning. Built-in templates are available to 
generate web server applications (php, perl, jsp), client applications (html pages with enabled 
on-page reasoning, javascript) and desktop applications (c++, xls). The technically most ad-
vanced export was that the whole intelligent portal (http://www.doctus.info/solutions/portal) 
was exported from Doctus ± but even we were not able to do this without the help of the pro-
grammer. The html page with on-page reasoning became quite popular on the one hand for 
providing a simple example of reasoning, on the other hand for collecting cases within a com-
SDQ\+RZHYHUWKHVHZHUHHSKHPHUDOLQWHUHVWVDQGXVXDOO\HQGHGXSZLWKµWUDGLWLRQDO¶XVHRI
Doctus. 
We wanted to make Doctus connectable to all sorts of databases so that we could retrieve the 
readily available case features as quickly as possible. Therefore we developed a series of ap-
plication programming interfaces (API) to get data from Excel, comma separated files, Micro-
soft Query, email, online databases, and finally from anything that can be handled via ODBC. 
As databases often contain numbers and many experts also indicated that they would like to 
use numeric data (from databases not what they personally articulate) we added a clustering 
algorithm to the import module. This way Doctus became capable of data mining. We have 
never seen a decision taker interested in any of these; and even the experts were exclusively 
interested in importing from Excel tables. The reason is not that Doctus was not as good at 
data mining as any other tool; actually we claim it to be one of the best. The decision takers 
are not interested in data mining. 
3. Conclusions and the µDoctus Light¶ 
Today we understand that the ES must not have the features that the decision taker does not 
want to use. Decision taking is far too serious issue for men to yield it to a computer. Perhaps 
we could now develop the m-Doctus, and perhaps it would work as we imagine it, and per-
haps we could achieve this within the programmability of the mobile phones. But that would 
be, again, something that only we thought to be useful. Previously we have spent large 
amounts of money to develop a data mining enabled Doctus, exported knowledge bases of 
various kinds ± these were our figments that the decision taker is not interested in. Advertis-
ing Doctus through its capacity to make the decisions transparent to the decision taker, and if 
(s)he wants also to others, was another useless idea we implemented ± the decision taker does 
not want to get into the fine details of her/his thinking process. 
So, which were the successful parts of the Doctus development over all these years? The two 
fundamental roles of Doctus to perform deductive and inductive reasoning were very useful; 
the deductive knowledge bases were mostly used to support original decisions, while the in-
ductive reasoning, as it requires cases with outputs, was typically used to support routine de-
cisions. We also must note that there was far more interest in supporting original decisions of 
large scope (sometimes called strategic decisions but we might prefer to identify them as ex-
pensive ones) than in routine decisions. In fact, on all those occasions when we built an induc-
tive knowledge base for an organization, it was a returning user ± so our first decision support 
was always for an original decision with a deductive knowledge base. The third way of rea-
soning, the reduction, was also very well received; it way mostly used to simplify the original 
decision by going through a deductive-inductive-reductive process and only in a few cases 
directly for delegating decisions or educating the junior decision takers. 
The only added feature that the decision takers showed any interest in is the smilies indicating 
the inconsistencies of the knowledge base, not necessarily to fix them but to think about them. 
There were two additional features which were useful to the experts rather than to the decision 
takers: the html export with on-page reasoning and the explanation feature. The Excel-like 
look and feel was also found useful mostly by the experts only ± the decision takers do not 
use spreadsheet applications. 
What are the missing features? What the decision takers and the experts would be interested 
in that Doctus does not provide at the moment? As with the previous features, the require-
ments of the decision takers and the experts are very different. Which ones to include in the 
new development? 
The experts liked the analysing tools which facilitate better understanding and would need a 
few more of the sort; e.g. they would likHWRKDYHµZKDWLI¶DQGµKRZWR¶W\SHWRROVRQWKH
top of the present explanatory feature. They also liked the external connectivity and the capac-
ity to handle numbers but they would also prefer to have it in a graphical sort of way. Not 
much of an invention would be needed; the SPSS statistical software has these features they 
only need to be copied. These are nice-to-have features, not essential requirements. The most 
claimed feature, the one that is sufficient in itself to prevent the experts from using Doctus is 
the reporting feature. If we want the experts to want Doctus this is a first priority develop-
ment. However, we decided otherwise. It was always the decision taker we supported, not the 
expert. So we shall focus on the needs of the decision taker rather than on the expert. We cut 
off all of these requirements and will continue to use the present version of Doctus to work 
with the experts. The new product will support the decision taker. 
The decision takers want an easy-to-use way of playing around with the decision. This means 
that the UI should be intuitively obvious, like driving a car. They would like to have a look at 
the whole knowledge base from various angles (different types of display) and to be able to 
amend it quickly and easily. This should also include the possibility to add complete knowl-
edge bases (created and maintained by the experts) on the input side (in deduction), without 
needing to examine these knowledge bases. To satisfy what we now see to be the expectations 
of the decision takers we decided to develop a new version of Doctus from scratch; all the 
features that the decision taker is not interested in will be removed (and that includes most of 
what we have added in the past decade), and we will try to make it really easy-to-use and 
playful. To reflect this approach we codenamed the new product Doctus Light. To make it 
available anywhere anytime, it will be a browser-based application. 
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